In Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc.2009 WL 1651442 (2009), the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Song-Beverly Act adds to the UCC’s implied warranty of merchantability by giving the warranty a duration equal to any express warranty on the goods, but at least 60 days and no more than a year after purchase.  (Civ. Code § 1791.1(c))  The duration provision is not a statute of limitations, nor is it a period during which the consumer must notify the manufacturer of the defect.  Rather, it is a period during which the goods must be merchantable, which is governed by the UCC’s four year statute of limitations, not the UCC’s notice of defect provisions.  The Court of Appeal summarized:

 

In support of their demurrer to the complaint, Rinker and Miller asserted that Civil Code section 1791.1, subdivision (c)-a provision of the Song-Beverly Act that defines the duration of the implied warranty of merchantability-is a one-year statute of limitations that bars Mexia’s claim.FN1 The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. After judgment was entered in favor of Rinker and Miller, Mexia appealed.     On appeal, Rinker and Miller concede that the duration provision is not a statute of limitations and that the applicable statute of limitations is four years. They argue, however, that the judgment can be affirmed on other grounds. Among other arguments, they contend that the duration provision of the Song-Beverly Act should be interpreted as barring an action for breach of the implied warranty of merchant-ability when the purchaser fails to discover and report the defect to the seller within the time period specified in that provision. We reject this argument because the plain language of the statute, particularly in light of the consumer protection policies supporting the Song-Beverly Act, make clear that the statute merely creates a limited, prospective duration for the implied warranty of merchantability; it does not create a deadline for discovering latent defects or for giving notice to the seller. Because we also reject Rinker and Miller’s other arguments, we reverse the judgment.