Court of Appeal (Wash.) Holds that FDCPA Does Not Require Re-Validation of Debt by Successive Debt Collectors

In Donohue v. Nielson, — P.3d —-, 2011 WL 1642914 (Wash.App. 2011), the Washington Court of Appeal found that successive debt collectors do not need to re-validate the debt; once is enough.  The Court of Appeal explained:

However, more recent cases have specifically disagreed. See Ditty v. CheckRite, Inc., 973 F.Supp. 1320, 1329 (D.Utah 1997) (“Section 1692g does not require another debt collector, undertaking collection efforts after a validation notice has been timely sent, to provide additional notice and another thirty-day validation period.”); Senftle v. Landau, 390 F.Supp.2d 463 (D.Md.2005); Nichols v. Byrd, 435 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1106–07 (D.Nev.2006) (holding that if Congress had intended to obligate every subsequent debt collector beyond the first to provide validation notice it would have explicitly called for it in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g); Oppong v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 566 F.Supp.2d 395, 403 (E.D.Pa.2008) (see below).  ¶ Nielson argues the court in Senftle, addressed this issue:  The Court again looks to the plain language of § 1692g, “[within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall unless the following information is contained in the initial communication … ], send the consumer written notice.” Though “communication” is broadly defined, the statute explicitly refers in the singular to “the initial communication.” Again, had Congress intended that there might be more than one initial communication with a debtor on a given debt, it certainly could have provided that, such as by explicitly requiring both initial and successive debt collectors to provide the § 1692g(a) validation no-tice. In fact, Congress made just such distinctions in § 1692e(11) when it distinguished between ini-tial and subsequent communications to a debtor on a given debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). Here the preeminent canon of statutory interpretation re-quires the court to “presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a stat-ute what it says there.” (citations omitted). The Court thus holds that there is only one “initial communication” with a debtor on a given debt under § 1692g(a), even though subsequent debt collectors may enter the picture.  Senftle, 390 F.Supp.2d. at 473 (alteration in original). ¶ 16 Additionally, the Court in Oppong observed: To the extent that there is authority to the contrary, see, e.g., Griswold v. J & R Anderson Bus. Serv., [citations omitted] it is not persuasive. Under the FDCPA, the goal of the initial communication is to advise the debtor of his rights and obligations to his creditor. Once the validation information is provided in the initial communication, and once the debtor is made aware of his rights at the time the collection process begins, it would serve no purpose to require that the same information be given again and again, each time the servicing function was passed from one creditor to another.”   Oppong, 566 F.Supp.2d at 404; see Br. of Resp’t at 7–8.  Nielson’s litigation was servicing the same debt for which Quick Collect gave a formal demand statement satisfying the validation notice requirements. Ms. Donohue was entitled solely to one debt validation notice. 15 U.S.C. section 1692g(a) did not require Nielson to send an additional notice to Ms. Donohue for collection of that debt.