After initially suggesting in Meadows v. Franklin Collection Service, Inc., 2011 WL 479997  (11th Cir. 2011) that it might take a decent approach towards TCPA litigation, the Court of Appeal for the 11th Circuit in Schweitzer v. Comenity Bank, 2017 WL 3429381, at *3 (C.A.11 (Fla.), 2017) issued another in a series of pro-TCPA-plaintiff decisions ensuring more work for its already overworked district courts by holding that a TCPA plaintiff can “partially” revoke consent to be called by an autodialer.  The Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit held:

We therefore conclude that the TCPA allows a consumer to provide limited, i.e., restricted, consent for the receipt of automated calls. It follows that unlimited consent, once given, can also be partially revoked as to future automated calls under the TCPA. “The consent principle … makes [a person’s] right of self-determination or autonomy the centerpiece of the law on intentional torts.” Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 105, at 319.  Our conclusion is supported by the maxim that the greater power normally includes the lesser. We think it logical that a consumer’s power under the TCPA to completely withdraw consent and thereby stop all future automated calls, see Osorio, 746 F.3d at 1255, encompasses the power to partially withdraw consent and stop calls during certain times.  . . .Under the TCPA, a consumer may partially revoke her consent to receive automated phone calls. The “issue of consent is ordinarily a factual issue,” Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 23, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984) (analyzing the Fourth Amendment), and here summary judgment here was inappropriate because a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Schweitzer partially revoked her consent to be called in “the morning” and “during the workday” on the October 13 phone call with a Comenity employee.