District Court (Fla.) Declines Supplemental Jurisdiction over Collection Claim by Auto Finance Company against TCPA Plaintiff

In fact, the typical TCPA action presents a handful of discrete questions (for example, whether the plaintiff consented to a call and whether plaintiff revoked consent), and Ally identifies no “substantial factual [or] legal issue[ ]” that distinguishes Della Vecchia’s claim from the typical TCPA claim.¹The counterclaims, which might devolve into a dispute about Ally’s compliance with the Florida law governing the repossession and the re-sale of a vehicle, likely will predominate over the TCPA claim. See, e.g., Ginwright, 2016 WL 5867443 at *5 (“[T]he more fact-intensive breach of contract counterclaim, which may involve analysis of whether [the defendant] followed state law requirements for repossession and resale, is likely to substantially predominate over the TCPA claim.”); Vernell v.Nuvell Cred. Co. LLC, 2016 WL 931104 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2016) (Chappell, J.).  II. “Set-off”.  2 Although Section 1367 fails to confer jurisdiction over Ally’s counterclaims, Ally contends that the “defensive set-off exception” permits exercising jurisdiction over the counterclaims “despite the absence of another independent jurisdictional basis.”² (Doc. 16 at 8) But the “federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “possess only that power authorized by [the] Constitution and [federal] statute[s].” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Whether titled “counterclaims” or “defensive setoffs,” the counterclaims warrant dismissal for failure to invoke subject-matter jurisdiction.