District Court (Nev.) Says FCRA and FDCPA Claims Were Barred by Statutes of Limitations

Here, plaintiff discovered the violations and began reporting the inaccuracies in his credit reports in 2013 and “later in 2014.” Plaintiff filed suit on September 26, 2017. All of the transactions plaintiff raises in his amended complaint occurred, at the latest, before January 1, 2015. The only events in plaintiff’s amended complaint that occurred after January 1, 2015, are his additional reports to defendant and CRAs that the information was incorrect.  Other courts have found, and this court agrees, that additional reports such as these cannot restart the limitations period because to do so would allow plaintiff to indefinitely extend the limitations period by simply sending another complaint letter to CRAs, which undermines the statute of limitations set by Congress. Bittick v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 917, 918-919 (N.D. Tex. 2006); see also Hancock v. Charter One Mortg., No. 07-15118, 2008 WL 2246042, at *2 (E.D. Mich., May 30, 2008) (holding that subsequent dispute letters regarding the same erroneous information does not restart the statute of limitations period when plaintiffs knew of the errors on their credit report more than two years before they filed suit); Blackwell v. Capital One Bank, No. 606CV066, 2008 WL 793476, at *3 (S.D.Ga., Mar. 25, 2008) (holding that permitting claims to go forward on the basis of subsequent complaint letters would allow plaintiffs to indefinitely extend the limitations period and render it a nullity, “an anomalous result”).  Here, plaintiff asserts that three accounts were erroneously reported by defendant to CRAs, two in 2013, and one “later in 2014.” (ECF No. 7, 18). Based upon plaintiff’s own assertions, plaintiff filed his complaint outside the two-year statute of limitations because plaintiff discovered these erroneous accounts in 2013 and 2014. Id. Despite plaintiff’s allegations to the contrary, his subsequent reports disputing these three accounts do not constitute discrete events such that they would toll or re-start the statute of limitations. See Bittick, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 918-919.

Here, plaintiff alleges that defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA in relation to two “erroneous collection accounts” when defendant reported these accounts to national credit agencies in 2013. (ECF No. 7 at 3). Plaintiff alleges that he contacted defendant immediately after the violations occurred. (ECF No. 7). However, plaintiff filed his original complaint on September 26, 2017. (ECF No. 1). Thus, plaintiff’s claims under the FDCPA regarding the 2013 debts are barred because he did not bring his claims within one year from the date of the violations. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).  Plaintiff also alleges that defendant reported a third erroneous account to CRAs “[l]ater in 2014.” (ECF No. 7, 18). Plaintiff alleges that he contacted defendant immediately after the violation occurred. (ECF No. 7). Further, plaintiff received a credit report on August 22, 2016, which included all three of the alleged erroneous accounts. (ECF No. 7 at 13). However, plaintiff did not file his complaint until September 26, 2017. Id. Therefore, the 2014 debt is likewise barred. Id.  Plaintiff asserts that each independent reporting of the erroneous accounts by defendant to CRAs constituted a discrete act that re-started the two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 6-8. However, as the court held in the context of plaintiff’s FCRA claim, the limitations period does not re-start solely because of subsequent additional reports of the same erroneous accounts. Bittick, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 918-919;see also Hancock v. Charter One Mortg., 2008 WL 2246042, at *2;Blackwell v. Capital One Bank, 2008 WL 793476, at *3.  Like plaintiff’s FCRA claims, plaintiff’s FDCPA claims are time-barred because he did not file his complaint until September 26, 2017. Accordingly, the court will grant defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FDCPA claims with prejudice.