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Attorneys' Fees

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This opinion affirms the trial court's denial of attorney fees sought by plaintiff in long-running litigation between the two parties.  Plaintiff recovered $38,0000 in the original proceeding.  It waited more than a year after the remittitur issued ending the appeal from that judgment before filing a separate action to enforce the judgment against the supersedeas bond that defendant had posted… Read More

Plaintiff attorney was hired by defendant as an in-house attorney, but his compensation was dependent, in part, on the outcome of a large bit of litigation in which the defendant was engaged.  This decision holds that plaintiff's agreement was a contingency fee agreement which was unenforceable because not written and signed by both parties as required by B&P Code 6147. … Read More

Deciding an issue left open in Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, this decision holds that a plaintiff who is an attorney but represents only himself cannot recover attorney fees under a common fund theory of attorney fee recovery since he does not pay or incur liability for any attorney fees.  However, such a plaintiff is entitled to recover… Read More

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its misappropriation of trade secrets claim, but continued to prosecute six other causes of action against defendant.  Defendant moved unsuccessfully for an attorney fee award under Civ. Code 3426.4 which allows fee awards for trade secrets claims brought in bad faith.  Defendant's appeal from the order denying its fee motion was dismissed.  The order was not a… Read More

A provision in an attorney's contingency fee agreement that purported to allow the attorney to consent on the client's behalf (and over the client's objection) to any settlement offer that the attorney thought was reasonable and in the client's best interest violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and was void.  Such a provision creates an immediate, direct conflict of interest… Read More

Hom entered into a lease with tenant.  The lease granted extensive rights to lenders to tenant, including performing tenant's obligations and assuming its rights under the lease.  Tenant sued Hom who cross-complained against tenant and Petrou, a lender to tenant.  As part of his settlement with tenant, Hom dismissed his cross-complaint against Petrou as well.  Petrou was awarded attorney fees… Read More

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for an attorney fee award on the ground that neither party had prevailed in the action.  Plaintiff tenant sued his landlord, asked the jury to award him $200,000 but recovered a jury verdict of only $6,450.  In view of plaintiff's recovery of such a small percentage of the… Read More

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in deeming plaintiffs the prevailing parties, entitled to an attorney fee award under Civ. Code 5975(c).  Plaintiffs sued their homeowners association, claiming it had not complied with the CC&Rs' requirement for homeowner approval in connection with its plan to erect a traffic light at the gate immediately adjacent to plaintiffs' property.  After… Read More

In awarding fees under CCP 425.16, the trial court did not err in using a market rate for the hourly rate rather than the discounted rate that defense attorneys charge high-volume insurance clients.  This market rate approach has been applied in cases involving in-house counsel, contingency fees, and pro bono work. The reasonable market rate need not mirror the actual… Read More

When an employee is the prevailing party on claims for minimum or overtime wages, she is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee on the claim pursuant to Lab. Code 1194.  That section prevails over Lab. Code 1031, which would otherwise limit the attorney fee to 20% of the recovery if the employee recovers less than $300.  The two statutes conflict,… Read More

It is an abuse of discretion in a civil rights or public interest case (such as this Song-Beverly Act case) to deny attorney fees altogether for time spent after the plaintiff rejects a 998 offer, so long as the plaintiff ultimately recovers more than the 998 offered.  Though the trial court retains broad discretion to evaluate post-offer attorney fees and… Read More

Plaintiff successfully sued defendant for violating a conservation easement on his property.  The trial court awarded plaintiff $2.9 million in attorney fees for five years of hard-fought litigation and a 19-day trial.  This decision affirms the award.  Plaintiff could recover fees for all hours spent by its attorneys though the first $500,000 in fees was paid for by its insurance. … Read More

The triall court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for an award of fees under CCP 2033.420(a) for proving facts stated in requests for admission that the defendant had wrongly denied.  None of the grounds the trial court stated were supported by the evidence.  Nor was the plaintiff required to allocate its fees to specific requests that defendant had… Read More

Although California and Indiana both generally enforce spendthrift trusts, the law of both states allow creditors to collect from the trust's assets when required by strong public policy--for example, to pay child support owed by the spendthrift beneficiary.  This decision holds that under the law of both states, the trust's assets are accessible to pay attorney fees that an opposing… Read More

In a Longshore & Harbor Workers Compensation Act case, the ALJ abused his discretion in awarding the prevailing claimant attorney fees at an hourly rate that was substantially lower than the rates that the claimant's evidence showed were prevailing rates for attorneys of equal skill in the same market area.  Use of historical market rate surveys is a proper means… Read More

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