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Constitutional Law

The following summaries are of recent published decisions of the California appellate courts, the Ninth Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court. The summaries are presented without regard to whether Severson & Werson represented a party in the case.

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True threats are not protected by the First Amendment.  True threats are “serious expressions conveying that a speaker means to “commit an act of unlawful violence.”  This decision holds that to prosecute a defendant for making a true threat, a state need only prove that the defendant was reckless in consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct… Read More

The county's sale of plaintiff's condo at a tax sale to collect delinquent taxes plaintiff owed.  The sale netted a sum greater than the taxes owed.  The county kept the surplus sale proceeds.  That was a taking of plaintiff's property that violated the Fifth Amendment even though state law allowed the county to keep the surplus.  To determine the scope… Read More

Defendant didn't infringe on plaintiff's First Amendment rights by restricting him from talking to potential witnesses and other of defendant's employees about plaintiff's alleged transgressions while defendant conducted an investigation of those matters.  Plaintiff was not prevented from speaking about matters of public concern, but only from discussing his own alleged violation of defendant's policies—a matter of private, personal concern. Read More

When an Anti-SLAPP defendant lodges a factual challenge, district courts may properly consider extrinsic evidence in evaluating whether a defendant has met her prima facie burden under either step of the Anti-SLAPP analysis.   If a defendant moves to strike “on purely legal arguments,” courts must analyze the motion under Rules 8 and 12, but where a defendant asserts “a factual… Read More

This decision holds that the complaint alleged a viable claim under CCP 526a to enjoin Orange County's program for collection of DNA samples from persons accused of misdemeanors on the ground that as applied it violated the accused's rights to privacy, counsel and due process.  Though Orange County had the accused misdemeanants sign forms waiving those rights, the complaint alleged… Read More

A taxpayer has standing to sue under CCP 526a to challenge a government program on the ground it is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied, at least if the as-applied challenge is broadly based, not confined to an aberrant application to one individual or a small group.  The taxpayer may bring the suit without having to identify any… Read More

Vehicle Code 27001 prohibits honking a car horn except when reasonably necessary to warn of a safety hazard.  Plaintiff was ticketed for honking her horn in a show of support for demonstrators protesting outside a government official's office.  Over a strong dissent, this decision holds that section 27001 is a content-neutral restriction on speech (to the extent a car horn… Read More

Olson, Uber and Postmates stated a viable claim that AB 5, which adopts the ABC test of employment for most employees, violates the Equal Protection Clause even under the rational basis test because of its many exemptions, including of app-based gig companies that perform errand services, which have similar business models to Uber and Postmates.  What differentiates this case from… Read More

CCP 203(a)(5) used to provide that any person convicted of a felony could not serve as a juror.  Now it provides that persons convicted of a felony cannot serve as a juror while in prison or on parole or while required to register as a sex offender.  This decision holds that the sex offender exclusion satisfies the rational basis test… Read More

This decision holds that there is a constitutional limit on aggregate statutory damage awards even if the statutory damage per violation passes constitutional muster.  An aggregate damage award may exceed due process limits in extreme situations—that is, when they are “wholly disproportioned” and “obviously unreasonable” in relation to the goals of the statute and the conduct the statute prohibits.  Constitutional… Read More

The defendant's application to the IRS to qualify an organization as a 501(c)(3) charitable organization was a protected activity under CCP 425.16(e)(1) or (2).  It was a submission in an official proceeding before an executive agency whose action was not purely ministerial but involved the exercise of judgment and discretion.  By contrast, filing of articles of incorporation and a statement… Read More

To determine whether speech or other conduct falls within the scope of CCP 425.16(e)(4)'s catchall provision, the court must make a two-step analysis, first asking what public issue or issue of public interest the defendant's conduct or speech implicates, and second asking what functional relationship exists between the speech and the public conversation about that issue of public interest--i.e., whether… Read More

The trial court correctly denied defendants' Anti-SLAPP motion to strike plaintiff's claims under the UCL and CLRA based on defendants' allegedly false statements in releases or other statements and advertisements that Michael Jackson was the lead artist on all tracks in a posthumous CD.  Even if the defendants' statements were protected speech under CCP 425.16(e), plaintiff showed a probability of… Read More

A plaintiff may apply to the court for leave to proceed by a fictitious name if privacy concerns outweigh the First Amendment interest in public access to judicial proceedings.  Here, the employee on whose behalf DFEH sued for employment discrimination said that revealing his identity and caste would subject him and his family to discrimination and jeopardize their safety in… Read More

A public entity (school board) violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights by blocking him from posting on the social media (Facebook) it used to communicate with constituents about public issues.  The page was a public forum.  Blocking plaintiff from using the page altogether was an overly broad restriction of his free speech.  Less restrictive measures would serve the entity's interest in… Read More

Four individuals protested the Golden Gate racetrack's allegedly improper treatment of race horses by sneaking onto the track, linking their arms by PVC pipes and lying across the track in a manner that prevented the racetrack from holding races.  The racetrack owner sued the four individuals for trespass and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, naming Direct Action as an… Read More

The female complainant in a university's disciplinary proceeding against a male student for alleged sexual assault on the complainant was not an indispensable party to the male student's mandate proceeding against the university for violating his due process rights in its proceedings which resulted in disciplining him.  While the complainant had an interest in the mandate proceeding, complete relief could… Read More

Despite CCP 1710.40'sopen-ended list of potential defenses to a sister state judgment, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the statute does not and cannot create an opportunity to raise defenses to the merits of the underlying claims resolved in the sister state judgment. Thus, defenses based on a contract's arbitration, forum selection and choice of law clause could not… Read More

One union representing some of Antioch's employees brought an administrative grievance making the same claim as the retired employee plaintiff brought in this later suit--that the City was stinting them on contributions for their benefit to CalPers,  This decision holds that the due process limits on collateral estoppel keep it from operating to bar the current suit based on the… Read More

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