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A private citizen group of taxpayers had taxpayer standing under CCP 526a to sue the District Attorney seeking an injunction to stop his office's confidential informant program, the principal aim of which was to secure confessions from criminal defendants in violation of their constitutional rights.  The suit was brought by taxpayers to enjoin waste of public funds on an illegal… Read More

Reversing the district court's judgment and permanent injunction, this decision finds that Qualcomm's patent licensing practices do not violate the Sherman Act.  The district court erred in finding anticompetitive harm from the effect Qualcomm's licensing practices had on cell phone manufacturersp--a market in which Qualcomm did not compete--rather than on rival chip manufacturers with which Qualcomm did compete.  Qualcomm's practice… Read More

Under the “sudden emergency” or “imminent peril” doctrine, “a person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with peril, arising from either the actual presence, or the appearance, of imminent danger to himself or to others, is not expected nor required to use the same judgment and prudence that is required of him in the exercise… Read More

James and Diane were temporary conservators of Elizabeth's person, but not of her estate.  When they had Elizabeth admitted to defendant's old folks home, James and Diane signed an arbitration agreement on Elizabeth's behalf.  This deision holds that the arbittration agreement was unenforceable against James and Diane sinnce they didn't sign in their individual capacity and unenforceable against Elizabeth because… Read More

The trial court wrongly granted a health insurer summary judgment on the insured's bad faith and UCL claims.  The insured's son was autistic and, before he turned 7 was given 157 hours a month of insured treatments.  When he turned 7, Magellan reduced the monthly allotment to 57 hours.  On the insured's appeal to the Department of Managed Health Care,… Read More

Johnson Sr. was the responsible managing agent for Johnson & Sons.  When he died, the younger Johnson didn't immediately substitute himself in as the company's RMO, so its license was automatically suspended for a period during which it completed work on the defendant's product. Held, since a single contract covered all of Johnson's work on the project, it couldn't recover… Read More

A landlord was not liable for the wrongful death of a hair dresser whose employer, a tenant in the property, had stored flammable hair treatment liquid on the premises, which ignited and incinerated the hair dresser/  The landlord had no actual or constructive knowledge that the employer was storing inflammable liquids on the premises and had no duty to investigate… Read More

Professional football players failed to allege a viable negligence claim against the NFL on a theory of negligence per se in distributing prescription pain killers and other drugs to enable injured players to continue competing.  The complaint did not allege facts showing that the NFL directly or indirectly supplied players with drugs or coordinated activities of clubs to do so,… Read More

Sammina Corp. gave two memos generated by its in-house attorneys to DLA Piper for the purpose of obtaining DLA Piper's valuation report which Sammina submitted to the IRS in support of its taking a worthless stock deduction in its income tax return.  The DLA Piper report mentioned and was based in part on the two memos.  Although district courts in… Read More

Shloss was Cohen's attorney in a disability discrimination suit Cohen brought against Golden State when one of its delivery drivers parked in a disabled persons parking spot to make a delivery.  Cohen claimed the delivery truck kept him from parking the disabled spot and thus blocked his access to nearby business A.  At trial, Cohen had no evidence to show… Read More

Under the continuing violations doctrine, an employer is liable for actions that took place outside the limitations period if these actions are sufficiently linked to unlawful conduct that occurred within the limitations period.  Here, Blue Fountain subjected the plaintiff to a continuous course of sexual harassment for more than a decade.  When plaintiff finally quit or was terminated, she sued. … Read More

Agreeing with Thomas v. Duggins Construction Co., Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1105, the Supreme Court holds that an intentional tortfeasor is not entitled to the benefits of Proposition 51 and CIvil Code 1431.2.  An intentional tortfeasor is fully liable for all of the plaintiff's economic and noneconomic damages.  Whereas, under secction 1431.2, a negligent tortfeasor is liable for the amount… Read More

An order denying a reconsideration motion under FRCivP 59(e) brought a year after an order denying summary judgment was not appealable.  The time to appeal the denial of summary judgment had long since expired.  A delayed motion for reconsideration under FRCivP 59(e) cannot be used to resurrect the case for appeal.  The denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is appealable… Read More

The United States chose not to intervene in Thrower's False Claims Act suit, but later filed a motion to dismiss the case.  The district court denied the motion to dismiss because it found the US had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a valid governmental purpose related to the dismissal and because it failed to fully investigate the allegations… Read More

Landlord filed an unlawful detainer action against tenant, alleging that tenant owed $27,100 in rent.  Before trial landlord settled with tenant.  The settlement provided for a date and time by which tennat would be gone from the rented premises, and provided for entry of a judgment for $28,970 if tenant was not gone by the deadline.  Tenant missed the deadline… Read More

Prob. Code 21620 and 21622 deal differently with pretermitted heirs born after and those born before the testator's death.  Section 21620 establishes a presumption that the heirs born after the testator's death were omitted unintentionally and thus are entitled to inherit, unless an opposing party proves otherwise.  Under 21622, however, the burden is on the heirs born before the testator's… Read More

After having class certification denied and losing a partial summary judgment motion, plaintiff entered into a stipulation with defendant for a voluntary dismissal so he could appeal.  However, the stipulation reserved his right to appeal only the summary judgment and class certification rulings, not an earlier dismissal of a claim on a motion to dismiss.  This decision holds that by… Read More

The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding the plaintiff to the local rule requiring a class certification motion to be filed within 90 days of filing the complaint, particularly, as it then gave the plaintiff another 30 days to develop evidence and the right to file a supplemental brief.  Plaintiff couldn't show he was kept from discovery… Read More

A bankrupt may assume an existing lease of personal property (such as a car) under 11 USC 365(p).  This decision holds that the debtor may assume the lease, and the creditor may enforce it after the debtor is discharged without also complying with the rrequirements for reaffirming a debt under 11 USC 524(c). Read More

B&P Code 16600 bans any agreement that restrains anyone from engaging in a lawful business or trade.  While the Court has interpreted the section as strictly forbidding any restraint in the employment context, a different rule--the rule of reason--applies to contracts restraining trade outside the employment context. Read More

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