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A generic name—the name of a class of products or services—is ineligible for federal trademark registration. However, when the generic name is combined with a generic a generic Internet-domain name suffix like “.com,” the combined "generic.com" name is generic and ineligible for trademark protection only if the combined term, taken as a whole signifies a class of goods or services… Read More

If a foreclosure plaintiff seeks not only to foreclose on the property but also to recover the remainder of the debt through a deficiency judgment, then the plaintiff is attempting to collect a debt within the meaning of the FDCPA.  But if the plaintiff is simply enforcing a security interest by retaking or forcing a sale of the property, without… Read More

An order granting a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence must be supported by a specification of reasons that does more than just recite ultimate facts.  The specification must point to the evidence which convinced the trial court that there was insufficient evidence on a particular issue.  Here, the specification of reasons did not do so. … Read More

Plaintiffs' suit is dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The suit challenged the city's establishment of two business improvement districts.  Under the applicable constitutional section authorizing those districts there is a detailed procedure for challenges to the proposed district, hearings and appeals.  The plaintiffs had not pursued those procedures.  They did not properly exhaust administrative procedures just by casting… Read More

Prob. Code 15401 sets out a statutory procedure for revocation of a revocable trust under which the trustor need only sign a revocation and deliver it to the trustee.  The trustor may avail himself of this statutory procedure unless the revocable trust expressly states that a different method of revocation set out in the trust instrument is the exclusive means… Read More

An action for an accounting upon dissolution of a corporation is not a special proceeding or an action for declaratory relief and thus is an action that triggers the compulsory cross-complaint rule under CCP 426.10 et seq. Read More

While a plaintiff may raise new legal theories on appeal from a dismissal on a general demurrer attacking the legal sufficiency of the complaint's factual allegations, that rule does not apply to an appeal from a dismissal on the ground that the claims alleged in the complaint are barred by the compulsory cross-complaint rule codified in CCP 426.10.  An appellate… Read More

A student prevailed in litigation against UCSB over its failure to follow its own policies requiring prompt investigation of sexual harassment or violence charges against a student particlarly when the university imposed an interim suspension on the student.  The student was reinstated and secured an injunction barring similarly delayed proceedings against other students.  This decision holds that the student is… Read More

The US Government grants NGOs funds to fight HIV/AIDS abroad, but only if they agree to have a policy expressly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.  The Supreme Court held that this requirement violated the First Amendment insofar as it applied to American NGOs.  But this decision holds that the requirement does not offend the Constitution insofar as it applies to… Read More

The CFPB's structure with a single director not subject to removal by the President except for cause is unconstitutional, violating the separation of powers principle and interfering with the President's authority to execute the laws of the land.  The remedy is to sever the povision barring removal without cause and allow the President to fire the CFPB director with or… Read More

The trial court has a duty to carefully scrutinize declarations for coercion or abuse that a defendant obtained from its employees (and putative class members) to oppose the plaintiff's class certification motion.  If the court finds evidence that the declarations had been obtained through coercion or abuse, it has broad discretion to either strike some or all of the declarations… Read More

Plaintiff secured a judgment against X based in part on a contract containing an attorney fee clause.  Thereafter, plaintiff sued Saleen seeking to enforce the judgment against him as X's alter ego.  Saleen won and moved for an attorney fee award.  Held, Saleen is entitled to a fee award.  Even though the suit on the judgment is technically not a… Read More

Under CCP 527.6(j)(1), the determination whether to modify or terminate a civil harassment restraining order is committed to “the discretion of the court.” That discretion includes, but is not limited to, the three grounds for modifying ordinary injunctions set forth in section 533.  A trial court has the discretion to modify a restraining order when, after considering the relevant evidence… Read More

It is error to dismiss an original complaint without leave to amend unless the complaint discloses on its face a reason why it cannot be amended to state a viable claim.  On appeal from such a dismissal, the appellant need not show anything in the record demonstrates that the complaint can be amended to allege a viable claim; rather, the… Read More

Labor Code 226 applies to wage statements provided by an employer if the employee’s principal place of work is in California.  This test is satisfied if the employee works a majority of the time in California or, for interstate transportation workers whose work is not primarily performed in any single state, if the worker has his or her base of… Read More

An employer must provide wage statements complying with Labor Code section 226 when an employee’s principal place of work is in California, which ordinarily means the employee works a majority of the time in California.  For interstate transportation workers and others who do not spend a majority of their working time in any one state, this test is satisfied when… Read More

State law limits on wage borrowing permit compensation schemes that promise to compensate all hours worked at a level at or above the minimum wage, even if particular components of those schemes fail to attribute to each and every compensable hour a specific amount equal to or greater than the minimum wage.  The no-borrowing principle--that an employer cannot "borrow" compensation… Read More

In the exercise of their equitable powers, courts may equitably toll statutes of limitation except when the Legislature has clearly indicated its intent that a limitations period not by extended by equitable tolling.  Gov. Code 11523, which sets a 30-day deadline for filing a petition for administrative mandate to review administrative determinations, does not clearly exclude equitable tolling.  Thus, equitable… Read More

The federal statute of limitations applicable to actions by the Federal Housing Finance Agency sets the limitations period at 6 years for contract actions and 3 years for tort actions.  12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(12)(A).  This decision holds that the same limitations provisions apply to assignees of instruments once owned by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, the housing finance isntitutions that… Read More

Bus. & Prof. Code 17204 and 17207 confer standing on district attorneys to sue under the UCL for restitution and civil penalties in the name of the people of the State of California.  A district attorney may obtain all allowed forms of relief--injunction, restitution and civil penalties--statewide at least so long some of the violations occurred in the county which… Read More

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