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Communications between the Agricultural Labor Relations Board and its general counsel are subject to the attorney-client privilege insofar as the communications pertain to the decision whether the Board should file a complaint seeking injunctive relief in court.  Read More

Counsel for the plaintiff class in one wage-and-hour suit against Apple is too conflicted to act as counsel for the plaintiff class in a separate wage-and-hour case against the same company, since members of the first class would likely be defense witnesses in the second class.  Read More

An expert who prepared a report for a competitor of plaintiff concerning the percentage of construction and demolition trash that plaintiff recycled proved its report was speech protected under the Anti-SLAPP statute, since the recycling rate of waste disposal companies is a subject of intense state and local regulation and there did not need to be a present, on-going controversy… Read More

Trial court should have granted defendant attorney’s anti-SLAPP motion after he was sued for supposedly aiding and abetting the wrongful acts of his client (a landlord) by defending him in a lawsuit brought by the plaintiff (a tenant).  Read More

In a suit seeking to overturn a state regulatory body’s cease-and-desist order that was preventing purchase of water rights, plaintiff water district was not entitled to a fee award under the Private Attorney General Act because its own financial interest in completing the purchase contract—broadly construed—far exceeded the amount it spent on attorney fees.  Read More

Common law policy of separating an administrative agency's prosecutorial staff from its lawyers advising the agency applies only to quasi-judicial proceedings before the administrative agency itself, and not to regular court actions.  Read More

In case involving knee injury that resulted from implantation of medical device, the jury’s award of $5 million in noneconomic damages was excessive and was the result of prejudice caused by misconduct of plaintiff’s counsel in belittling and mocking defendant's witnesses and counsel as well as the trial court itself.  Read More

The one-year limitations period on medical malpractice begins to run when the plaintiff first becomes aware that a preexisting disease or condition has developed into a more serious one, and since the evidence conflicted on this point, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant.  Read More

In suit by fitness club member who slipped on shower room floor and broke his arm, summary judgment was properly entered in favor of fitness center since membership agreement contained a release of claims of ordinary negligence, and plaintiff did not plead or prove gross negligence.  Read More

A successor corporation that carries on a judgment debtor's business under a new business name may be added as a judgment debtor to a default judgment without proof that it controlled the litigation, but individuals may not be so added unless they are the corporation’s alter ego and had control over the original litigation.  Read More

The district court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s 10b-5 complaint based on lack of scienter, since defendant told its investors a misleading half-truth by disclosing that animal studies had confirmed the drug’s efficacy but omitting the fact that rats who received the drug had shown increased incidence of cancer.  Read More

Enforcement of a security interest is not collection of a debt under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, so a deed of trust trustee does not act as a debt collector, subject to that Act, in taking steps to nonjudicially foreclose the deed of trust.  Read More

A car dealer selling a “certified” used car must provide the buyer, before the sale, with an inspection report that lists each part that was inspected and states how the part performed on inspection; failure to provide the report violates the Consumers Legal Remedies Act and the Unfair Competition Law.  Read More

Labor Code 226 does not require an employer to list on an employee's ordinary pay stubs the amount of vacation benefits earned but not paid during the pay period.  Read More

Summary judgment for defendant casino is reversed as questions of fact exist about whether casino was a common carrier, subject to a stricter standard of care, in providing a van to transport gamblers to and from an adjoining town.  Read More

The one-year limitations period governing medical malpractice actions (CCP 340.5) governs a claim of injury suffered on a fall from a hospital  gurney, since gurney transport was under a doctor’s orders and was integral to the patient’s treatment.  Read More

The district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief from dismissal due to its having filed an amended complaint two days after the deadline, since there was no prejudice, no bad faith, and the short delay was attributable to a reasonable misunderstanding of the district court’s docketing practices.  Read More

Plaintiff reasonably rejected earlier settlement offers requiring general releases and nondisclosure agreements and so was properly awarded her attorney fees under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act after agreeing to a settlement lacking those provisions.  Read More

A contract's indemnity clause requiring plaintiff to indemnify defendant against all claims resulting from defendant's performance of the contract applied only to claims by third parties—and not to claims asserted by one contracting party against the other, since there was no explicit language indicating the parties intended to agree to fee-shifting in that manner.  Read More

In this car crash case, substantial evidence existed to support jury verdict in favor of defendant, after defendant testified that he mistakenly—but in his opinion, reasonably—thought he could get through intersection safely before plaintiff's car came through in a cross-direction.  Read More

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