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Distinguishing Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp. of California (2018) 4 Cal.4th 542, this decision holds that in calculating the "regular rate of pay" for overtime work by a "dual rate" employee, the employer is not required to use the weighted average method of computing regular rate of pay but may instead calculate regular rate of pay by using the rate-in-effect… Read More

In awarding fees under CCP 425.16, the trial court did not err in using a market rate for the hourly rate rather than the discounted rate that defense attorneys charge high-volume insurance clients.  This market rate approach has been applied in cases involving in-house counsel, contingency fees, and pro bono work. The reasonable market rate need not mirror the actual… Read More

CCP 527.8(o) allows a respondent in a workplace harassment injunction action one mandatory continuance in which to respond to the petition.  This decision holds that when the respondent has already filed a written response to the petition, 527.8(o) is inapplicable, and the respondent is not entitled to a continuance of the injunction hearing absent a showing of good cause under… Read More

The trial court prejudicially erred in this asbestosis case in giving a causation instruction based on California law.  In an earlier writ proceeding, the Court of Appeal had held that Michigan law applies to this case, at least as against Marley-Wylain because the plaintiff worked in Michigan while employed by Marley-Wylain and was exposed to asbestos in Michigan during that… Read More

This decision states that an arbitrator may not consider an Anti-SLAPP motion to strike, but it finds that the arbitrator's error in granting such a motion was harmless.  At the second stage of the Anti-SLAPP analysis, the arbitrator had to consider the merits of the defendant's cross-complaint.  The arbitrator found that the litigation privilege (Civ. Code 47(b)) barred the cross-complaint. … Read More

Calling for en banc review of Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC (9th Cir. 2019) 940 F.3d 1130, this decision refuses to extend Monster Energy's holding.  Disclosure is required only if the arbitrator has a non-trivial ownership interest in JAMS (or other arbitration administrator) and only if JAMS (or other) has non-trivial business dealings with the opposing party--not the… Read More

The Agricultural Labor Relations Board's access regulation (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 20900) gives agricultural labor unions a limited right to access to agricultural workers while on their employer's property for an hour before and after work and during the lunch hour for four months out of the year.  This decision holds that the regulation is a per se… Read More

The Federal Housing Finance Agency's structure is unconstitutional in providing that the President can remove the head of that agency only for cause.  However, that fact does not invalidate the acts taken by the FHFA's head or entitle shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to damages unless they can prove that the restriction on the President's power (as opposed… Read More

The Justice Against Sponsors of International Terrorism Act of 2016 (JASTA; 18 USC 2333) amended the ATA to include secondary civil liability for aiding and abetting, or conspiring to commit, acts of international terrorism.  To recover under that section on an aiding and abetting claim, the plaintiff must show (1) the party the defendant aided committed an act of international… Read More

Distinguishing Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com, LLC (9th Cir. 2008) 521 F.3d 1157, this decision holds that section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230) immunizes internet service providers whose only content-enhancing action is to apply a neutral algorithm to refer users to third-party content that appears related to items they have recently… Read More

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adding P as an additional judgment debtor.  The trial court's early granting of summary judgment to P when she was initially sued in the case didn't prevent her from later being added to the judgment, since the summary judgment absolved her of indiivdual liability for the wrongs committed, while adding her… Read More

To invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance under Basic, Inc. v. Levinson (1988) 108 S.Ct. 978, the plaintiff must  prove: (1) that the alleged misrepresentation was publicly known; (2) that it was material; (3) that the stock traded in an efficient market; and (4) that the plaintiff traded the stock between the time the misrepresentation was made and when the… Read More

A shareholder in a California-based corporation has Article III standing to sue the California Secretary of State to seek to enjoin SB 826 (2018) which enacted Corp. Code  301.3, 2115.5, requiring covered corporations to have at least one female director by 2019 and up to three female directors by 2021.  Even though the statute is directed against corporations, not their… Read More

The NCAA is not entitled to any special immunity from application of the Sherman Act.  The district court properly evaluated the NCAA's rules limiting athletes' compensation under the rule of reason analysis.  At either end of the spectrum of restraints, abbreviated analysis may suffice to show the challenged restraint either is or is not a violation of the Sherman Act. … Read More

The trial court retains jurisdiction to consider and approve a final report by a receiver appointed to remediate a nuisance caused by a substandard building is appointed under both H&S Code 17980.7 even after the plaintiff governmental entity dismisses the action.  The receiver's final report and motion for its approval must be served on all persons with an interest in… Read More

In a personal injury action, a plaintiff must, before entry of a default serve the defendant with a statement of damages by the same means as the plaintiff served the summons and complaint.  Here, service by publication had been authorized.  Plaintiff could and did properly serve the statement of damages by publication without an additional order permitting service of the… Read More

After serving a defendant by publication, the plaintiff may obtain entry of the defendant's default if the defendant does not file an answer, a motion to transfer, a motion to quash service of summons, a motion to strike or a demurrer within the time for filing an answer.  (CCP 585(c).)  Here, within the time for answering, defendant filed a motion… Read More

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting service by publication.  Substantial evidence supported its finding that plaintiff had made diligent efforts to locate Singh and serve him by other means.  He had tried service by mail, but received no signed receipt.  He tried substituted service at Singh's purported place of business but found no one present with… Read More

Two individuals and a number of states lack standing to challenge the minimum essential coverage provision of Obamacare because Congress eliminated the penalty for non-compliance with the statutory requirement of minimum coverage.  As there was no longer any governmental compulsion to obtain the coverage, the individual plaintiffs could not show that their supposed injury from having paid for coverage was… Read More

The Alien Tort Claims Act does not apply extraterritorially.  In this case, plaintiffs did not allege acts occurring within the United States that are the focus of the statute's concern.  They said only that the corporate defendants made corporate decisions in the United States.  That was insufficient.  The actual acts of foreign cocoa growers' use of child slave labor and… Read More

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