In Bishop v. Ross Earle & Bonan, P.A., 2016 WL 1169064, at *3 (11th Cir. 2016), the Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit held that communications between a debt collector and debtor’s counsel counsel are subject to the FDCPA, but still are subject to the least sophisticated consumer standard.
We join the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that a debt-collection notice sent to a consumer’s attorney is just such an “indirect” communication. See Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir.2011); Evory, 505 F.3d at 773; Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 232–33 (4th Cir.2007). This conclusion flows from a commonsense understanding of the attorney-client relationship. See Evory, 505 F.3d at 773 (“The lawyer receives the notice and shares it with, or explains it to, his client. Hence the debt collector is communicating with the consumer within the meaning of the Act….”); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.4 (2014) (“A lawyer shall … keep the client reasonably informed [and] explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions .”). The attorney is a conduit to the consumer; thus, a debt-collection letter sent to the consumer’s attorney is an indirect communication with the consumer. . . . Nor will we craft a broader version of the “competent lawyer” standard than that described in Evory and Dikeman. The “least sophisticated consumer” standard is grounded in the history and purpose of the FDCPA. . . Consumer-protection laws are “not made for the protection of experts, but for the public—that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous.” . . The “least sophisticated consumer” standard advances this purpose, and we will not abandon it lightly. . .We hold that the communication alleged in this case states a claim for “false, deceptive, or misleading” behavior under § 1692e. Neither the “competent lawyer” nor the “least sophisticated consumer” could be said to have notice of the “in writing” requirement after receiving a letter like the one alleged.
The Court of Appeals held that the debt collector violated the FDCPA by not including the “in writing” requirement of the debt validation notification.
The Collectors next argue that by omitting the “in writing” requirement they were simply waiving that requirement and agreeing to permit Bishop to dispute her debt either orally or in writing. They assert that such a waiver protects consumers and thus actually advances the purpose of the FDCPA. In particular, they suggest that debt collectors who waive the “in writing” requirement (by omitting it from the notice of debt) are protecting consumers by accepting a less demanding means of dispute than they are otherwise entitled to require. Thus, the Collectors argue, omission of the “in writing” requirement does not violate § 1692g. We reject the notion that § 1692g gives debt collectors discretion to omit the “in writing” requirement or cure improper notice by claiming waiver. The statute is clear. The debt collector “shall” notify the consumer of her right to dispute the debt in writing. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). . . Nothing in the statute suggests that debt collectors have discretion to relax these requirements.