We find that this voicemail, and other voicemails like it, constitute a communication within the meaning of the FDCPA. Specifically, we hold that a voicemail can, and will, be considered a communication under the FDCPA if the voicemail reveals that the call was from a debt collection company and provides instructions and information to return the call. However, we stop short of requiring individual callers to identify themselves by name to avoid violating the FDCPA. Specifically, we hold that meaningful disclosure is provided as long as the caller reveals the nature of the debt collection company’s business, which can be satisfied by disclosing that the call is on behalf of a debt collection company, and the name of the debt collection company. We remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The 11th Circuit found that voicemails are “communications” under the Act, but that a debt collector meaningfully identifies itself in a voicemail by leaving the company name and that the call on behalf the debt collector.
Whether it was the debt collector’s first communication with the consumer is significant only in determining whether the debt collector should have given the required disclosures, also known as the “mini Miranda” warning. Here, Credit Control should have provided Hart with the required disclosures. The FDCPA requires the “mini Miranda warning” to be given in the initial communication between a debt collector and consumer. Specifically, this warning requires that the debt collector disclose that he or she is “attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). In this case, because the voicemail was not only a communication, but the first communication, Credit Control was required to do just that. . . On the other hand, Credit Control provided meaningful disclosure even though its callers failed to leave their names.. . .We are now asked to determine whether “meaningful disclosure” is provided when an individual caller fails to disclose her name but discloses the name of the debt collection company and the nature of the company’s business. We answer that question in the affirmative.. . .We hold that meaningful disclosure does not require the individual caller to reveal her name, and this holding comports with text of the FDCPA. Section 1692 prohibits debt collectors from “harass[ing], oppress[ing], or abus[ing] any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. And in line with that goal, subsection (6) prohibits placing “telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.” See id. at § 1692d(6). The FDCPA provides consumers with recourse following abusive behavior by debt collectors during the course of collecting a debt. Given this scheme, the debt collection company’s name is plenty to provide “meaningful disclosure.” The individual caller here is working on behalf of the debt collection company, which is the actual entity collecting the debt. An individual caller’s name is ancillary to the debt collection company’s name and adds little value to a consumer who seeks to complain about the debt collection company’s behavior. The company is collecting the debt; the caller is merely an arm of the company. Equipped with the knowledge that the call is being placed on behalf of a debt collection company and the company’s name, a consumer has enough information to protect herself under the FDCPA. Among other things, Hart argues that the plain language of the statute requires the individual caller to reveal her name because the FDCPA states that debt collectors may not place “calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) (emphasis added). Hart advocates for us to take the phrase “the caller’s identity” quite literally, which would imply that meaningful disclosure requires the identity of the individual actually placing the call. However, that reading is a little too literal and adopting it would pull us away from our duty to “bear[ ] in mind the fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” . . . Overall, the FDCPA and, more specifically, § 1692d aims to protect consumers from unsavory practices of debt collectors. Thus as long as the consumer is made aware of the debt collector’s name, i.e., the company collecting the debt, meaningful disclosure is provided. The identity of the caller is meaningfully disclosed provided that both the name of the debt collection company and the nature of the company’s business are disclosed. This is so because the debt collection company’s name and the nature of its business are enough to prevent the debt collector from “harass [ing], oppress[ing], or abus[ing]” the consumer. Because the individual callers here disclosed that they were calling on behalf of Credit Control, a debt collection company, Hart was provided with meaningful disclosure, and thus no violation of § 1629d(6) occurred.