9th Circuit Reverses Denial of Class Certification under CLRA against Vehicle Manufacturer

In Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., — Fed.Appx. —-, 2015 WL 847193 (9th Cir. 2015), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s denial of class certification of a CLRA claim against a vehicle manufacturer.

In an action alleging consumer protection claims based on a vehicle defect, commonality is satisfied when “[t]he claims of all prospective class members involve the same alleged defect, covered by the same warranty, and found in vehicles of the same make and model.” Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir.2010) (stating that common questions included whether defect existed). In order to satisfy the predominance requirement, the plaintiff need not prove the existence of the defect. See  Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013) (stating that “Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common to the class predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class”). ¶  Individual factors, such as driving conditions, may affect surging, but they do not affect whether the Freestyle was sold with an ETC system defect. See  Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1173 (rejecting argument that class certification was inappropriate because evidence would show that prospective class members’ vehicles did not suffer from common defect in alignment geometry that caused premature tire wear but, rather, from tire wear caused by individual factors such as driving habits and weather). Moreover, by providing classwide relief through its notice and repair program, Ford has acknowledged that a single class defect exists. ¶  The district court also erred in holding that materiality under the CLRA would require individualized proof. Under the CLRA, each potential class member must both have “an actual injury and show that the injury was caused by the challenged practice.” Berger, 741 F.3d at 1069 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the need for an individual determination of damages does not, by itself, defeat class certification. Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir.2013). A manufacturer has a duty to disclose a known defect that poses an unreasonable safety hazard. Wilson v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1141–43 (9th Cir.2012) (citing Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 127 (Ct.App.2006)). Because materiality is governed by an objective “reasonable person” standard under California law, an inquiry that is the same for every class member, a finding that the defendant has failed to disclose information that would have been material to a reasonable person who purchased the defendant’s product gives rise to a rebuttable inference of reliance as to the class. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 190, 197 (Ct.App.2002).