In Robinson v. Point One Toyota, Evanston — N.E.2d —-, 2012 IL App (1st) 111889, 2012 WL 6725904 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2012), the Illinois Court of Appeal found that an automobile lease complied with Regulation M:
[The Plaintiffs] maintain that, as a matter of law, their lease agreements violated the disclosure requirements of the CLR and Regulation M in that default provisions contained in paragraph 21 of lease agreements were confusing and ambiguous and unable to be understood by inexperienced consumers.. . . ¶ 68 Under the CLA, the defendants were required to give the plaintiffs a written statement, set-ting out accurately and in a clear and conspicuous manner and “as applicable,” “[a] statement of the conditions under which the lessee or the lessor may terminate the lease prior to the end of the term.” 15 U.S.C. § 1667a (11) (1994). The lease agreement stated that the plaintiffs could not terminate the lease prior to the end of the leasing period. It would be difficult to write that provision in a way that would render it more accurate, more clear and more conspicuous. A change in the lease agreement terms required a new written agreement between the parties applied to any change in the lease agreement terms, and only if the lessor chose to enter into a new agreement. We find nothing inaccurate, unclear or inconspicious about the disclosure of that provision. ¶ 69 The plaintiffs’ reliance on Clement v. American Honda Finance Corp., 145 F.Supp.2d 206 (D.Conn.2001), is misplaced. In determining that an early termination provision in a vehicle lease agreement violated the CLA’s disclosure requirements, the district court relied on Lundquist. The court acknowl-edged that “if this case were decided in the Seventh Circuit a different outcome would be required.” Clement, 145 F.Supp.2d at 213. The court rejected the defendant’s suggestion that it adopt the Seventh Circuit precedent, i.e. Channell, stating, “[t]his court, cannot, however, either overlook or overrule binding Second Circuit precedent [Lundquist].” Clement, 145 F.Supp.2d at 213. ¶ 70 The plaintiffs’ reliance on Candelaria v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 740 F.Supp. 806 (D.N.M.1990), is also misplaced as that case is dis-tinguishable. In Candelaria, the vehicle lease pro-vided that if the lessee wished to terminate the lease early, the lessee should contact the lessor but did not set forth the charge or method for determining the charge the lessee would incur in terminating the lease early. The district court held that the absence of a method for determining the charge for early termination left the charge subject to future negotiations without an objective or ascertainable standard and was “contrary to a federal policy to promote the informed use of credit through the meaningful disclosure of the terms of leases of personal property * * *.” Candelaria, 740 F.Supp. at 810. ¶ 71 Unlike the lease in Candelaria, the lease agreements in the present case clearly denied the plaintiffs the right to terminate the lease. Therefore, there was no requirement to set forth the charge or method of determining the charge for early termination of the lease. The lease agreement further dis-closed to the plaintiffs that the defendants had no obligation to agree to a change in the terms of the lease agreement. Possessed of the knowledge that they had no right to early termination of the lease, or to change the terms of the lease agreement in any respect, the plaintiffs were free to look elsewhere in the market place to lease a vehicle. ¶ 72 Neither the CLA nor Regulation M requires that a lease agreement provide the lessee the right or opportunity to terminate the lease. If the lease agreement does so provide, it must comply with the disclosure requirements of the CLA and Regulation M. The lease in this case accurately, clearly and con-spicuously informed the plaintiffs that they could not terminate the lease voluntarily. Therefore, paragraph 20 of the lease agreement did not violate the disclosure requirements of the CLA and Regulation M.