District Court (Cal.) Says Debtor Lacks TCPA Standing to Sue for Calls Placed to Debtor’s Mother’s Cell Phone; Says Rosenthal Act Barred by SofL

Further, although unwanted telephone calls can create an actual, albeit intangible, injury sufficient to constitute standing, unwanted telephone calls to a relative—even a mother—do not. See Olney v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1225 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (concluding only a subscriber or user of the telephone number called has standing to sue for violations of the TCPA). Caruso does not allege that he suffered any disruption or annoying invasion of privacy from calls made to what he claims was the wrong number and not his. He does not claim he answered these calls. His mother, on the other hand, may have a cause of action for these telephone calls, and, in fact, she has sued for these alleged violations of the TCPA in Case No. 17-cv-00626-BAS-MDD.  Hence, to the extent Caruso is alleging a violation of the TCPA for calls to his mother’s cell phone (#760-840-1806), the Court GRANTS MCA’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing. However, this does not end the inquiry. Caruso also alleges that calls were made to his cell phones (#760-216-0157 and #760-877-4404) using a prerecorded message. (SAC ¶¶ 21-22.) Although MCA suggests these allegations may be spurious, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court must assume the allegations in the Complaint are true. Thus to the extent Caruso is alleging calls were made to one of his cell phone numbers and not his mother’s, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.