District Court (Cal.) Says Rosenthal Act Plaintiff Passed Spokeo Threshold

Defendant’s analysis is unpersuasive. There is no material difference between receiving an unsolicited call as part of a general marketing effort and receiving one as part of an effort to collect an outstanding debt. Indeed, a call made in an effort to collect on a debt is specifically focused on the person who receives it; a marketing call could be made to any person or to one thought to be within a particular subset of the population. Therefore, with respect to the standards that apply to the Motion, there is no basis to conclude, as a matter of law, that a debt collection call has less effect on a consumer than a marketing call.   This outcome is consistent with Van Patten. It explained that, in passing the TCPA, Congress was concerned with protecting consumers from the nuisance and invasion of personal privacy that may be caused by automated or prerecorded telephone calls. Id. at 1043. Except in certain limited circumstances,¹ neither the identity of the caller nor the purpose of the call is germane to stating a claim under the TCPA. The provisions of the TCPA that prohibit certain phone calls do not distinguish those made for telemarketing, debt collection or any other purpose. Recognizing this, other district courts have applied Van Patten in connection with TCPA claims based on calls made in connection with an effort to collect a debt. See, e.g., Banarji v. Wilshire Consumer Credit, 2017 WL 1346654, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2017). Banarji found that the plaintiff “received unsolicited, automated calls to her cell phone from WCC, which is sufficient to confer Article III standing under Van Patten.” Id.   The Complaint alleges that the unsolicited, automated phone calls “invaded Plaintiff’s privacy,” Dkt. 1 ¶ 17, “wasted Plaintiff’s time and caused annoyance, stress, and distraction” by calling her while she was working, id. ¶ 18, and caused her “emotional distress from the fear of being sued or otherwise harassed by the constant collection calls,” id. ¶ 20. These allegations reflect the very “nuisance and privacy invasion” harms that Congress sought to address with the TCPA. Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043. This is sufficient to confer Article III standing. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”). Finally, to the extent that there is an issue as to the level of the “annoyance, stress, and distraction” that Plaintiff experienced, that factual matter cannot be addressed on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.