In Sclafani v. BC Services, here, Judge Huck held refused to allow an FDCPA harassment claim by a non-debtor to proceed against a debt collection agency. As to the mini-Miranda requirement, Judge Huck explained:
To allow a person who knows that he does not owe a debt, and does not even know the debtor, to bring suit as a ‘consumer’ would unreasonably expand the scope of the FDCPA. Thus, the Court finds that Sclafani does not state any facts supporting a claim under § 1692e(11).
As to the absence of meaningful indentification, Judge Huck held that it was not required because the debt collector complied with the rules governing obtaining location information:
The two calls that Sclafani claims violated § 1692d(6) fall within § 1692b, the exception to § 1692d(6). In both calls, the caller identified his or her name, noted that he or she was attempting to contact Samantha Gielow, requested that the message be relayed to Ms. Gielow, and provided a toll-free telephone number for Ms. Gielow to return the call. Importantly, Sclafani does not allege that he requested the callers’ employer information, that the callers on either of the two calls stated that Ms. Gielow owed a debt, or that he answered or returned the calls to notify the callers that Ms. Gielow was not at the called telephone number. Therefore, the Court finds that BC Services did not violate the provision because both of those calls fit into the exception to § 1692d(6).
Finally, as to the harassment claim, Judge Huck found violation based on the absence of a pattern demonstrating intent:
Sclafani alleges that BC Services violated § 1692d(5) by “[c]ausing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number[,]” by calling his home telephone and leaving seven voice messages between July 13, 2009 and March 31, 2010.2 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5). ¶ . . . The facts, as alleged in the Complaint, state that BC Services left seven voice messages for Sclafani over the course of six months. Sclafani alleges that BC Services also “left similar or identical messages on other occasions[,]” but does not substantiate those claims or provide additional detail. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 10.) Sclafani cites no case suggesting that so few calls over the course of so many months demonstrates an intent upon the part of a defendant to annoy, abuse, or harass the person answering the phone. In contrast, BC Services points to several cases, including Tucker v. CBE Group, a case where a defendant made 57 calls to a plaintiff, with as many as seven calls per day.. . . The court in Tucker noted that the plaintiff never asked the defendant to cease calling, and the substance of the calls indicated that the defendant’s intent was to reach the debtor, not to harass the plaintiff. Id. As in Tucker, BC Services’ voice messages indicate that it was attempting to locate Samantha Gielow, not to annoy, abuse, or harass Sclafani, regardless of the number of times that BC Services’ employees called. Sclafani does not indicate that he ever asked BC Services to cease calling his residence. Additionally, the calls were placed at intervals of more than two weeks apart. Such a pattern does not suggest that BC Services attempted to annoy, abuse, or harass Sclafani. As noted in Chalik v. Westport Recovery Corp., the examples of harassing conduct listed in § 1692d involve behavior intended to harass, upset, humiliate, or panic a debtor.” 677 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329–30 (S.D. Fla. 2009). That conduct notably is absent in the present case. Therefore, the Court finds that BC Services did not violate § 1692d(5).