District Court (Fla.) Says Auto Finance Company’s Counter-Claim on the Debt Was Permissive, and Not Compulsory, to the Plaintiff’s TCPA Claim

In Vernell v. Nuvell Credit Company, LLC, 2016 WL 931104, at *3-4 (M.D.Fla., 2016), the Court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an automobile finance company’s counter-claim to its customer’s TCPA claim.

It is clear from the record that the Counterclaim—a simple breach of contract claim—does not raise a new or complex issue of state law, the federal law claim has not been dismissed, and there are no exceptional circumstances to consider. . . . As such, three (3) of the four (4) factors used to determine if the Court should decline to take supplemental jurisdiction are not germane to this case. However, courts in this district and elsewhere have found that a permissive breach of contract counterclaim will predominate over a TCPA claim. See Dayhoff, 2014 WL 466151, at *2 (citing Campos v. W. Dental Servs., Inc., 404 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1170–71 (N.D.Cal.2005) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over debt collection counterclaim); Randall v. Nelson & Kennard, No. CV–09– 387–PHX–LOA, 2009 WL 2710141, at *6 (D. Az. Aug. 26, 2009) (same); Moore v. Old Canal Fin. Corp., No. CV05–205–S–EJL, 2006 WL 851114, at *4 (D. Idaho Mar.29, 2006) (same). Because the Counterclaim will most likely predominate over the Plaintiff’s TCPA claim, the Court declines to take supplemental jurisdiction over Ally’s Counterclaim. Thus, dismissal under § 1367(c)(2) is warranted.  Since the Court finds that it should not take supplemental jurisdiction over Ally’s Counterclaim, there is no reason to consider whether or not there is a logical connection between the TCPA claim and Ally’s Counterclaim.