Here, the Court emphasizes that Fair Collections’ only developed argument is that under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A), the debt need not be in connection with a credit transaction. The Court, however, agrees with the court in Miller that insofar as 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A) is concerned, a credit transaction is a necessary prerequisite. Fair Collections did not present any arguments or authority to demonstrate that Ms. Pigg’s debt is in connection with a credit transaction. Its only other argument with respect to whether Ms. Pigg’s lease agreement is a credit transaction is that Ms. Pigg “is being extended a form of credit which will ultimately be collected from her,” [Filing No. 50 at 4], but it cites no authority to support this proposition. The Court is not making a finding as a matter of law that Ms. Pigg’s lease agreement with her former landlord is not considered a credit transaction. It also does not foreclose the possibility that Fair Collections had another permissible purpose under the FCRA to retrieve Ms. Pigg’s credit report. Rather, it finds that based on Fair Collections’ narrow argument, it has failed to present any grounds to dismiss Ms. Pigg’s FCRA claim.
In Pigg v. Fair Collections & Outsourcing of New England, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01902-JMS-DML, 2017 WL 3034266 (D. Ind. July 18, 2017), Judge Magnus-Stinson held that a rental agreement was not a consumer credit transaction under the FCRA so a debt collector had an impermissible purpose to access the debtor consumer report for collection purposes.