District Court (Ohio) Allows FDCPA Defendant to Take (Former) Director Richard Cordray’s Deposition Since He’s Now Resigned, But Protects Current High-Level CFPB Employees From Deposition

However, since the filing of the protective order, Mr. Cordray has resigned from his position as Director of the Bureau and is no longer a “high-level government official” that warrants protection from being deposed. Therefore, this Court DENIES the Motion for Protective Order as it relates to Mr. Cordray. As it relates to Attorney Preis’ deposition, the Bureau argues that WWR has not met the burden of demonstrating that no other means exist to obtain the information sought; that the information sought is relevant and non-privileged; and, that the information is crucial to the preparation of the case. (ECF #21-1, p. 8)(citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 278 F.2d 621 (6^th Cir. 2002); Shelton v. Am. Motor Corp., 805 F.2d 1323 (8^th Cir. 1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that parties may obtain discovery “regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” District courts, however, have discretion to limit the scope of discovery when the information sought is overbroad or unduly burdensome. See In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, 845 F.3d 231, 235 (6^th Cir. 2016).  Based upon all of the factual and legal arguments presented in the briefs, that Attorney Preis has shown that the relevant information sought has either been provided, been properly withheld due to privilege, or can be obtained through other sources. (See, e.g., ECF #21-2; ECF #24-1 thru #24-5 (affidavits, correspondence and pleadings relating to discovery)). The discovery sought by WWR via these depositions is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(1). For these reasons, the protective order blocking the deposition of Attorney Preis is GRANTED.