District Court (Ohio) Applies Reyes, Declines Ability of TCPA Plaintiff to Orally Revoke Consent

Mr. Barton also argues that he “revoked any consent he may have given” to Credit One. (ECF #47, p. 1). The facts illustrate that while Mr. Barton may have orally asked Credit One’s agents to stop calling his telephone, the Cardholder Agreement provided the following:  “COMMUNICATION REVOCATION: If you do not want to receive communication as described [herein], you must (i) provide us with written notice revoking your prior consent, (ii) in that written notice, you must include your name, mailing address, and the last four digits of your Account number…(iv) if you are requesting communications to cease via telephone(s) and/or email, please provide the specific phone number(s) and email address.”  (See ECF #36, p. 4).  The facts reflect that on September 29. 2016. Credit One received correspondence from Mr. Barton’s counsel that adhered to the revocation language provided in the Cardholder Agreement. When Credit One received this revocation correspondence, it flagged the account and no further calls were made to Mr. Barton.  The revocation clause within the Cardholder Agreement is valid and enforceable, and Mr. Barton cannot unilaterally alter the terms of the agreement to claim that his oral revocation of consent was valid. Despite Mr. Barton’s reliance on distinguishable case law. the TCPA “does not permit a consumer who agrees to be contacted by telephone as part of a bargained-for transaction to unilaterally revoke that consent.” Reyes v. Lincoln Auto. Fin.Serv., 861 F.3d 51. 56 (2d Cir. 2017).  Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Barton did not sufficiently revoke his consent to be contacted by Credit One until September 29, 2016. Therefore, any contact Credit One had with Mr. Barton prior to that date did not violate the TCPA.